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Introduction
Dani Rodrik (2015) has written an exceptional book. We believe it will help economists
and non-economists to communicate more effectively with each other, and economists
to appreciate better what they are doing. His notion of critical assumptions facilitates
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the articulation of a point that economists have probably always been aware of: they do
care about the realisticness of at least some assumptions, even though Friedman seemed
to say otherwise.
Our purpose in this paper is to investigate the applicability of Rodrik’s account of
model selection to the dominant modelling platform in macroeconomics, viz., Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models. Given that macroeconomics is one of
the major branches of economics, especially in terms of application, it should be covered
in any general account of the use of economic knowledge. Yet, although Rodrik outlines
the recent twists and turns in macroeconomics at the level of general theory and outlook,
he does not really examine the practice of applied macroeconomic modelling, merely
suggesting that his account of model selection (and possibly of diagnostics) ought also to
be applicable to macroeconomics.
According to Rodrik, economic knowledge accumulates ‘horizontally’ in
producing ever more partial, context-sensitive and even mutually inconsistent models of
new aspects of economic phenomena. This is to be contrasted with the lay idea of the
‘vertical’ growth of scientific knowledge, meaning that a science progresses through the
revision and refining of a single core theory, from which specific applications are
straightforwardly derived as special cases. The vertical conception also holds that a more
accurate and truthlike theory automatically leads to improved empirical applicability. In
contrast, the implication behind a horizontally growing toolbox of partly disjoint models
is that the crucial skill of applying economic knowledge to explain or influence the real
world lies in the judicious selection of the right model(s) for the particular epistemic task
at hand. This is as much an art as it is ‘science’. In Rodrik’s view, there is nothing wrong
with such a ‘science’ as long as the models wear their conditions for applicability on their
sleeves.
We examine how the key step of identifying critical assumptions is complicated
by the interconnectedness of the common structural core of DSGE models, and the
myriad of more or less ad hoc modifications introduced to model various rigidities and
other market imperfections. We also examine the implications of these difficulties for
the applicability of Rodrik’s scheme to model selection in macroeconomics. There is
definitely an art to macroeconomics, but it is the art of ad hoc modification rather than
of outright model selection. We conclude our paper with a brief exploration of the
alternative ways of adopting Rodrik’s philosophy of economics into macroeconomics.
New paragraph: use this style when you need to begin a new paragraph.
What is model selection?
Let us start with a description of Rodrik’s ideas about selecting models. He tells the
following story about how economics ought to be, and partly is, conducted. Economists
consider a menu of models such that the question to be studied determines which
assumptions are to be considered ‘critical’. Critical assumptions are those that ought to
approximate reality at least reasonably well (p. 29). The economist’s task is to select the
right model, the one that best fits the setting (p. 11). Theoretical progress occurs via
developing new models that consider aspects of social phenomena not covered in earlier
models rather than replacing older models with new, more ‘realistic’ ones (p.  64).  The
judicious selection of models hinges on two ideas. First, the critical assumptions must fit
the setting, in other words they must be realistic enough in the context of the study;
second, the direct and incidental implications of the model must be consistent with the
observed outcomes (p. 94). Empirical evidence thus has a role in model selection, but
Rodrik is aware that some models are very difficult to test, and that many empirical tests
are brittle (p. 65). Consequently, the empirical results are often weakened or overturned
by subsequent empirical analyses, hence ‘the profession's progression of favoured models
tends to follow fad and fashion, or changing tastes about what is an appropriate modelling
strategy, instead of evidence per se’ (p. 65). Nevertheless, the horizontal expansion of
models is frequently based on empirical observations that contradict existing models (p.
70). Finally, what makes economists engage in model selection is either a change in
circumstances or a change in the setting on which they focus (p. 6).
In principle, if model selection is interpreted as simply selecting individual
models from a given menu, one might think that it would be more applicable to central
bankers or advisors to governments than to academic researchers. However, given that
even many macroeconomists outside academia modify and combine existing models to
create new ones (cf. Boumans 1999), we adopt a flexible interpretation of model
‘selection’ including the whole business of selection, modification and application. If
Rodrik’s model-selection story is to be understood as a methodological guideline, one
might ask what exactly is it that it rules out. One of the clearest morals of the story is that
economists should be careful with benchmark models that presume well-functioning
markets: ‘common blueprints are out; model selection is in’ (p. 166). One size does not
fit many, and models often need to be modified with case-specific market imperfections
(p. 61). He also notes that model selection is not a onetime affair, but a continuous process
of modification and accommodation to changing epistemic needs.
How exactly, then, are models to be selected? How should one weigh the different
models when making judgments about, say, appropriate monetary policy? It is easy to
understand why Rodrik does not really have much to say about this, other than noting that
economics may also advance through better methods of model selection, by ‘improving
the match between model and real-world setting’ (p. 183). When it comes to
macroeconomics, it is easy to say with hindsight that ‘there was too much Fama, too little
Shiller’ (p. 159). Willem Buiter’s (2009) lament that during the recent turmoil central
banks could not find any useful support from highly-trained young economists is well
known. There was very little demand for dynamic programmers in central banks when
financial instability became the main concern. All of a sudden central banks were
implementing policies that could only be justified with recourse to economic theories
developed decades ago. Such events indicate that there has been a deeper problem with
the kind of macroeconomics that economic scientists have developed, and its use by the
central banks: if economists are not actively developing models that central banks can
use, choosing from such a menu is not a good idea (Solow and Touffut 2012).
Nevertheless, Bernanke1 argued that the financial crisis was more of a failure of economic
engineering and management, than of economic science.
Let us now consider the development of macroeconomics since the emergence of
real business cycle (RBC) economics circa 1982 (Kydland and Prescott 1982). It was
clear from the outset that the RBC models would not be able to track empirical data
particularly well. Consequently, they were amended by increasing the number of shocks
and were later transformed into NK-DSGE models by introducing various frictions. New
Keynesian models such as these have since been changed into a form in which they can
be estimated by first calibrating a few parameters. The latest incarnations take into
1 ‘Implications of the Financial Crisis for Economics’, Speech at the Conference Co-sponsored
by the Center for Economic Policy Studies and the Bendheim Center for Finance, Princeton
University, Princeton, New Jersey, September 24, 2010. Stiglitz (2011) disagrees with
Bernanke.
account the lessons learned from the financial crisis in explicitly modelling the financial
sector. Nevertheless, there is a fundamental sense in which the core model has remained
the same: what some call the ‘Ramsey model’ of intertemporal optimization has been a
key ingredient of all these models. The core model has thus been extensively
supplemented with various components so as to obtain a better fit with the data.
Although both theoretical and applied macroeconomics certainly involve model
selection, it does not mean that the development described above can be characterized as
horizontal expansion. This is understandable given that macro-modelling seems less
suitable for progressing via horizontal expansion than other fields of economics simply
because macro-models, at least those used for forecasting, simply cannot ignore some
parts of the economy to allow one to concentrate one’s modelling efforts on something
else. This is especially evident in large-scale, country- or region-specific models used by
central banks, the aim of which is simultaneously to include as many sectors, market
imperfections and other amendments as possible while retaining the essential core
elements. This is vertical expansion in that new modifications and ‘improvements’ are
added to the generally accepted but in itself simplified and idealized core model to
improve its realisticness and empirical accuracy.
Differing from Rodrik’s horizontal expansion, model development in
macroeconomics appears, at least at the outset, to proceed along the lines proposed by
Ylikoski and Aydinonat (2014), who emphasize the notion of a model family (see also
Balzer and Dreier 1999). According to Aydinonat and Ylikoski, a model family is formed
around a set of critical assumptions (the central mechanism), which remains the same
within the family, and testing the robustness of the main results is essential to the
empirical interpretability of the model family as a whole (see also Kuorikoski, Lehtinen
and Marchionni 2010). Although clearly constituting a family of models in some sense,
DSGE modelling also differs from Aydinonat & Ylikoski’s account in crucial respects.
DSGE models are also built to capture new macroeconomic mechanisms, and this brings
in an aspect of horizontal development. In addition, robustness analysis is problematic
within the DSGE family, as shown below. However, insofar as the new model is built on
top of a large number of familiar theory-based elements, it brings vertical rather than
horizontal progress.2 A common blueprint, a model template into which more context-
specific additions are plugged into, is definitely in, and advocates of the blueprint credit
it with turning macroeconomics back into a normal science. Whether what has transpired
has been a desirable development from the perspective of Rodrik’s account of model
selection depends, in part, on the stance one takes on the necessity of microfoundations
and intertemporal maximization.
2 Thus, when Bernanke and Gertler (1989), for example, formalized the financial accelerator in
a general equilibrium framework they started a model family because several later papers
used their framework. Similarly, when Iacoviello (2005) built a model with ‘heterogeneous’
consumers with respect to borrowing constraints (and thus propensities to consume) on top
of Bernanke and Gertler’s model, he started another model family. Yet, neither of these
examples count as horizontal development because the models were constructed within a
strictly theory-driven framework.
Selecting the ‘right’ DSGE model
According to Rodrik, the function of an economic model is to capture the central causal
mechanism(s) at work in the particular empirical context of application. DSGE models
are indeed tailored to fit particular contexts: big models used for forecasting and for
running alternative policy scenarios are built to be country- or region-specific, whereas
theoretical models are built to highlight only some macroeconomic relations of interest.
Such tailoring is achieved by introducing modifications to the core ‘microfounded’
growth model, and these modifications may or may not have an underlying justification
in terms of individual maximization.
Let us consider next the questions that arise about how model selection is
supposed to work when considering the modifications required for tailoring the core
DSGE model. Models should be selected so that their critical assumptions fit the situation
at hand. According to Rodrik, critical assumptions would produce a substantively
different result if they were altered to be more realistic (p. 94). The notion of a critical
assumption is thus multi-functional. As a concept it purports simultaneously to define
what is crucial (or what is the key causal mechanism), what the modellers’ intended target
is in some context, and what changes in assumptions change the results that can be
derived. The two main problems in applying the concept to macroeconomics are that it is
difficult to tell what would count as a critical assumption, and that the different functions
of the concept come apart.
First, many of the most central assumptions, such as intertemporal optimization,
never change in DSGE models: even if the modifications concern the behavioural
assumptions, the core optimization model is never abandoned. In other words, altering
this assumption to make it more realistic is only possible if the whole DSGE framework
is abandoned, and even then it can only be changed along with so many others that it
becomes difficult to pin the changes down to this specific assumption.
Second and more generally, identifying what assumptions are truly critical is
much more difficult in the case of DSGE models than in simpler applied microeconomic
models. The structural core is interconnected with the ‘ad hoc’ modifications and with
various other assumptions that are practically necessary for tractability reasons.
Furthermore, all DSGE models share some assumptions simply because it has been
mathematically too difficult to modify them, or because the modifications require
resorting to even more problematic ad hoc fixes elsewhere in the model.
Consider, for example, two consequences of the ubiquitous Dixit-Stiglitz
aggregator: the assumption that the consumer’s preferences are homothetic and the
assumption that firms engage in monopolistic competition. It is eminently reasonable to
assume that the unemployed have a radically different consumption basket from the well-
to-do, and that such differences also have consequences in terms of economic
fluctuations. If one wishes to study the consequences of non-homothetic preferences on
macroeconomic  development  with  a  macro-model  one  first  has  to  get  rid  of  the
representative consumer, and then give different consumers different non-homothetic
preferences. This used to be too difficult to be a feasible modelling option in the DSGE
framework, and DSGE modellers thus typically treated homothetic preferences as an
auxiliary assumption. One could thus conclude that homothetic preferences was not a
critical assumption. Since Iacoviello (2005), economists have found ways of modelling
such  heterogeneity,  and  it  is  now  known  to  affect  various  results.  The  status  of  this
assumption has thus changed from being an auxiliary to a critical unrealistic assumption.
The Dixit-Stiglitz became popular in macro models primarily because it provided a
tractable way of modelling some form of less than perfect competition. The fact that it
implies specifically monopolistic competition is not really considered an additional asset.
Ideally, macroeconomists would like to employ a fully realistic array of market forms,
but thus far including oligopolies and monopolies together with monopolistic competition
has not been tractable. We will thus only know whether the assumption of universal
monopolistic competition is critical if this tractability problem is solved.
Furthermore, theoretical and methodological criticism of the DSGE framework
has put the causal interpretability of its microeconomic core in doubt (see e.g., Colander,
Howitt, Kirman, Leijonhufvud and Mehrling 2008, A. Kirman 2010a, 2010b): It has been
claimed that the use of representative-agent constructs is not theoretically justified
because results within general equilibrium theory show that the rationality properties of
individuals do not aggregate nicely. In effect, a consequence of using such constructs in
DSGE models is that economic phenomena resulting from coordination problems among
heterogeneous agents cannot arise by assumption. One cannot safely draw causal
conclusions about alternative policies with such models, because the reactions of the
representative agent to shocks or parameter changes during economic crises may not
coincide with the aggregate reactions of the actual agents. These arguments have been
used to imply that the DSGE model cannot be interpreted as a causal model of the market
economy based on assumptions about the market mechanism. Such a criticism would
therefore  also  invalidate  the  rationale  for  model  selection.  We do  not  further  dwell  on
these arguments here, however.
Another set of contentious methodological issues relates to the empirical
assessment of models. Rodrik admits that economic models cannot really be tested
against the specific empirical features they are built to capture, and that checking the
secondary implications of the modelled mechanism is therefore important in model
selection. Although the official empirical DSGE methodology of model ‘calibration’ was
originally intended to allow for the estimation of crucial model parameters (such as risk
preferences or the subjective discount rates of consumers) from multiple independent
sources of data, in practice it has often meant curve-fitting the model to available
macroeconomic time-series or long-run averages (such as aggregate labour). The use of
DSGE models in central banks roughly coincides with the development of estimable
versions, starting with Smets and Wouters (2003), and current big-policy models are
parametrized through a combination of calibration and Bayesian estimation.
The use of DSGE models in empirical work is routinely justified on the grounds
that they allow modellers to impose probabilistic restrictions on the data, making
identification and estimation of the structural model easier. With this in mind, let us
consider Jon Faust’s (2009) efforts to see how the Swedish central  bank DSGE model
(Ramses) behaves with respect to the short-term interest rate and consumption growth in
a Bayesian estimation. The prior derived from the theoretical DSGE model, which is used
in estimating Ramses, starts from a strongly negative contemporaneous correlation
between these variables. A correlation of about –0.6 is most likely in the prior, and values
near zero are considered quite improbable. Yet, it is a common finding that there is little
systematic relation between these variables3. The Bayesian estimation approach
combines the model, the prior belief and the data to form a new assessment of all aspects
of the model. The posterior still fairly strongly favours a negative correlation with the
most likely value of around –0.4, and once again values near zero are very implausible.
Thus,  the  estimation  of  the  Ramses  model  was  based  on  a  strong  prior  belief  that
consumption is quite sensitive to interest rates, and this prior belief continues to be
3 This is regularly mentioned in discussions on macroeconomic methodology (e.g., Gerlach
2017). See e.g., (Campbell and Mankiw 1989) for a review of the econometric results.
reflected  in  the  posterior.  If  this  is  how  DSGE  models  help  solve  the  problem  of
identification, we fail to see the benefit in that imposing probabilistic restrictions on the
data seems to systematically lead one astray (cf. Canova and Sala 2009). More generally,
some studies that do not start from DSGE-based priors even fail to find the technological
shocks that are alleged to be driving the business cycles (Juselius and Franchi 2007).
DSGE model selection in context
Despite the problems, there seems to be some justification for using these models. As
Rodrik states, general-equilibrium effects (i.e., consequences of the simultaneous
interaction of all important markets) are among the core economic phenomena that tend
to be deeply unintuitive and hence are especially in need of explicit modelling. DSGE has
become the standard platform on which to conduct policy analysis in a general-
equilibrium setting. The models are also clearly superior to previous macro-models in
being able to incorporate imperfect competition, nominal rigidities and the non-neutrality
of  money.  They  now also  have  some claim to  predictive  success  in  that  they  seem to
predict some key variables better than fully a-theoretical VAR models or expert
judgement (Smets and Wouters 2003, Del Negro and Schorfheide 2013). All in all,
proponents of DSGE models claim that they provide the best all-around performance and
therefore constitute the preferred platform for discussing, debating and evaluating more
specific macroeconomic questions (del Negro & Schorfheide 2013). Their use in
empirical work is often justified by the claim that they are the only kind of models that
have the necessary resources to provide coherent theory-based stories about what happens
in the economy. As Tony Yates writes in his blog on macroeconomics and public policy:
Microfounded models are models which tell an explicit story about what the
people, firms, and large agents in a model do, and why.  What do they want to
achieve, what constraints do they face in going about it?  My own position is that
these are the ONLY models that have anything genuinely economic to say about
anything.4
The claim is thus that DSGE models are indeed able to provide, or at the very least have
the resources to provide information on alternative causal hypotheses, and that they do
this by telling a theoretically coherent story of individual behaviour. An interesting
question then arises concerning what such claims amount to and what is their basis, given
that DSGE models are based on the crucial assumption of intertemporal optimization,
which is routinely falsified in empirical work. Before we explore this central issue, let us
see how Rodrik’s views on model selection fit current mainstream macroeconomics.
DSGE modelling involves significant amounts of seemingly ad-hoc parameter
adjustments, fiddling with the structural assumptions and multiple runs in producing what
are judged to be reasonable predictions. As such, the models are more like platforms for
integrating various kinds of data with expert judgement than alternative models capturing
single or a few key causal mechanisms. To show how applied macro modelling differs
from Rodrik’s view of model selection, we next briefly explore the way in which DSGE
models are used in policy-oriented research in the Bank of Finland as well as in more
academic macroeconomic research. Although sharing the core defining DSGE features,
models built for policy use tend to be more complex and estimated on a richer data set
than “academic” DSGEs built to answer specific theoretical questions. This is to be
4 https://longandvariable.wordpress.com/
expected given that forecasting and the evaluation of policy counterfactuals require the
inclusion of all relevant sectors of the economy with empirically plausible
parametrization, whereas models aimed at answering theoretical questions should be as
simple as possible so as to remain theoretically tractable.5
The central  workhorse of the Bank of Finland is the Aino (2.0) model.  Aino is
BoF’s main integrating macroeconomic forecasting model and the platform of choice for
running policy scenarios. It encompasses 39 parameters and takes in data from 24
variables using combined methodology including calibration and Bayesian estimation.
The model is country-specific in that it emphasizes features important to a small open
economy, as well as being estimated with country-specific data (1995-2014). Although
some specificities are built into the model (such as the structure of the banking sector and
the economy as part of a currency union but having substantial trade with countries
outside the union), many country-specific features are, in fact, modelling outcomes
attributable to empirical estimation (such as the very rigid wage setting and the
importance of technology-driven productivity shocks, reflecting the disproportionate
importance of the telecoms industry during the period of estimation). We talked with a
modeller and a policy advisor working in the BoF to get a better idea of the modelling
practice.
There is an element of “model selection” in this practice, in that for each
modelling exercise the model has to be reprogrammed accordingly. As an example, let
the Bank be commissioned to study the impulse response of an export shock. The
5 Justiniano et al. (2017) raise concerns about this apparently growing gap between theoretical
and applied DSGE modelling.
‘modellers’ now write a first version of the suitably modified program and study the initial
results.  The  initial  results  are  always  problematic,  at  least  with  respect  to  some  key
variables.6 The modellers therefore usually have to fiddle with the lags and expectations
so as to find a better fit with the existing data. Although philosophers might find this
curious, the practice is not perceived as problematic because the main culprit in these
empirical discrepancies is well-known: the purely forward-looking nature of the model
(the  rational  expectation  hypothesis).  It  is  therefore  natural  to  fix  these  problems  by
fiddling with the expectations (see also Alvarez-Lois, Harrison, Piscitelli and Scott 2008).
When ‘the computer guys’ have produced their first model version, they meet
with  economic  advisors  who  know  the  details  of  what  is  going  on  in  the  Finnish  and
international economy. Further model development is then a dialogical process between
the advisors and the modellers. It is far from evident how exactly the collapse of Nokia
and the temporary Russian import restrictions affected the Finnish economy, for example.
Obviously, there is no specific variable for Nokia’s profits or turnover in the model, but
somehow such factors have to be included, and the modellers cannot usually decide how
this ought to be done without substantial topic-specific knowledge.
In  sum,  even  though big  policy  models  are  always  customized  for  the  specific
country of application and for each given forecasting or policy-scenario evaluation, they
always include all the main components (all the markets and their specific
6 This was especially true of the older, non-linearized Aino 1.0 model, which routinely produced
‘completely crazy’ initial results. The linearized and estimated 2.0 behaves much better.
Whether this is attributable to structural improvements or to more efficient empirical
accommodation due to linearization is a key question that is difficult to answer.
characteristics). In fact, many of the modifications are made to correct for the empirically
implausible implications of the core ‘blueprint’.
DSGE models come in many shapes and sizes, and those used in academic theory-
driven research are usually considerably smaller. As such, they focus only on selected
key mechanisms or effects at any one time. Such theoretical modelling is therefore likely
to adhere more closely to Rodrik’s account of model selection. Nevertheless, although
simpler, these models are still computational and therefore have to be parametrized
according to some set of data.
We interviewed7 an academic economist about his DSGE-based research on the
effects of a trade agreement or the effect of fiscal devaluation in a two-region (north-
south) single-currency economy. Given that this is more theoretical research, the
plausible results of such modelling exercises are not point predictions, but the signs and
plausible magnitudes of the specific shocks in question. Nevertheless, because the results
are based on a computational model the parameter values have to come from somewhere,
and there is considerable pragmatism in the way in which the models are parametrized:
in addition to using straightforward empirical (macro) estimates, parameter values may
be based on empirical micro studies, what is commonly used, what feels right, and what
simply works in terms of accommodating the predicted dependencies to their best
empirical estimates.
Some form of  stability  analysis  is  usually  carried  out,  but  there  is  no  ‘official’
established methodology for this. Although there is therefore a substantial element of ‘ad-
hocness’ in this empirical calibration, one should keep in mind that the objective is not to
7 13.9.2015, Helsinki. Notes available on request.
provide point predictions, but to offer empirically grounded yet ultimately theoretical
arguments. Whether various ad hoc assumptions, either in the model construction or in
the calibration, are legitimate or not should be evaluated in light of this epistemic role.
Although theoretical DSGE models are constructed (or ‘selected’) in answer to a
particular question, the answers are always partly driven by the shared core model, as
well as by the specific additions used in the exercise at hand (such as the two-region
common currency model). As with computational models, it also tends to be difficult to
separate analytically the importance of the core and of the case-specific assumptions, and
to derive theoretically isolated dependencies responding to the ‘key mechanisms’. The
response to criticisms targeted at the shared theoretical core of the DSGE model is swift
and unambiguous: it is completely useless to criticize the model platform itself. DSGE is
taken as the only reasonable choice, the best available tool for reasoning about inter-
related multiple markets in a quasi-quantitative way. The common blueprint is seen as a
necessary condition for a meaningful and theoretically rigorous macroeconomic
discussion.
Microfoundations and ad-hocness
DSGE models are certainly not loved by everybody. Olivier Blanchard (2016) bluntly
states in a recent policy brief that they are based on seriously flawed assumptions,
empirically estimated by means of unconvincing methods (with alternative methods
having dramatic effects on the policy implications), and that the normative implications
that are crucial for policy advice are consequently implausible. Having said that, he
nevertheless defends their use, possibly because even though they are flawed, he firmly
believes that macroeconomics needs a shared modelling platform, a common blueprint,
and that the basic DSGE modelling choices are ‘obviously’ the right ones.
How, then, can the ‘seriously flawed’ assumptions of the core New Keynesian
model be the ‘obviously’ right ones? Most of the recalcitrant empirical shortcomings of
DSGE models are direct consequences of the core assumptions of intertemporal
maximization and rational expectations: shocks do not persist as long as observed, they
do not result in hump-shaped responses, inflation and output are affected too rapidly by
monetary shocks, and there is too little inflation inertia. Although these empirical failings
may be and are ameliorated by the addition of various frictions and other ‘propagation
mechanisms’ to the models, the forward-looking nature of the core-price-adjustment
equation (the new Keynesian Phillips curve) in particular makes it hard for even the more
developed models to capture central stylized facts about price dynamics – as is readily
admitted by policy modellers.
The main function of DSGE models is to provide a general equilibrium platform
for modelling the whole economy, thus allowing theoretical interpretation of the observed
and  predicted  data.  Central  banks  do  not  exclusively  rely  on  DSGE  models  for
forecasting, and the ECB and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, for example, use
them mostly for integrating data and expert judgement: they also provide the ‘coherent
theoretical interpretation’ of the forecasts and policy scenarios arrived at by multi-model
and multi-method means (Alessi et al. 2014). Explicit microfoundations are considered
necessary for providing both the coherent theoretical interpretation and the underlying
structure necessary for conducting counterfactual policy analysis. These two functions of
the theoretical core model are automatically equated, because they were implicitly
equated in the Lucas critique: only models and parameters that can be derived from the
maximizing behaviour of individuals with rational expectations can possibly be structural
(invariant under policy interventions).8 As Smets et al. (2010, p. 52) put it, ‘The general
equilibrium structure lends itself to telling economically coherent stories and structuring
forecast-related discussions around it… They give a better feel for which parameters are
likely to be policy invariant and which ones are not.’ This makes it understandable why,
despite their ‘serious flaws’, the chosen core assumptions are ‘obviously the right ones’.
As Blanchard states: ‘Starting from explicit microfoundations is clearly essential; where
else to start from? Ad hoc equations will not do for that purpose.’ Ad hoc equations not
derived from microfoundations are therefore not bad only in virtue of being epistemically
dubious epicycles, but also by threatening the structural interpretability of the model.
The differences between macroeconomists and philosophers in their
understanding of the term ‘ad hoc’ should be noted. The understanding of the term among
mainstream philosophers is roughly the following: something is ad hoc if it is specifically
designed for some particular purpose. 9 Thus an element of a theory is said to be ad hoc
if it is introduced solely so that the theory will entail certain statements (accommodate
certain evidence), and there is no further reason for including the ad hoc element.
8 This is also given as an answer to the question of why no-one in the private sector uses DSGE
models for forecasting: if you cannot do policy, you do not need to be Lucas-proof.
9 See e.g., Grünbaum (1976) for a classic, and Votsis (2016) for more recent discussion. We
also note that some recent discussions of ad hoc hypotheses in philosophy emphasise the fact
that all efforts to explicate them have failed, and they have not been able to come up with a
clear notion of what they are (Hunt 2012).
However, the term ‘ad hoc’ is often used in macroeconomics to describe any model
elements that are not backed up with an explicit maximization story. The main problem,
as conceived of by most macroeconomists, is that the raw RBC model does not fit the
data, and the new ‘ad hoc’ Keynesian additions cannot usually be justified on micro-
foundational grounds. New Keynesian DSGE models are thus typically internally
inconsistent because they include a rational representative individual (in the sense that it
optimizes intertemporally and employs rational expectations) who is simultaneously
supposed to exhibit habit persistence or set prices as if they could never be reset again,
for example. The add-ons are thus theoretically incompatible with the foundational
assumptions.
The motivation for developing microfounded models is to avoid the Lucas critique
by developing models in which the policy-invariant parts can be clearly distinguished
from parts that change with policy, and those who vigorously demand microfoundations
think that applying microeconomic theory to the representative agent provides a
satisfactory microfounded model. Microfoundations are based on the notion that the
behaviour of individuals is targeted on maximizing some objective function, hence one
can avoid imposing ‘ad hoc’ restrictions on macroeconomic variables. As Faust (2009)
notes, however, there is a weak and strong form of the microfoundation requirement. The
former merely requires consistency of macromodels with microtheory, whereas the latter
also requires consistency with microdata. Wade Hands (1988) argued long ago that RBC
economists were using the notion of ‘ad hoc’ in the sense now associated with Lakatos10:
an assumption or hypothesis is ad hoc if it does not follow the dominant heuristics in a
10 Lakatos in fact distinguished between three senses of ad hoc.
given field of research. Although most current DSGE modellers seem to hold on to this
idea, is it justified to posit that mere inconsistency with microtheory is always ad-hoc?
Note that this question can be asked independently of the validity of the Lucas-critique.
We surmise that there are two distinct underlying reasons for thinking that
assumptions of non-rational behaviour are ad hoc. First, as Harsanyi (1966) and Boudon
(1998)  argue,  for  example,  one  needs  the  theory  of  fully  rational  behaviour  as  a
benchmark even for irrational behaviour, because one can only understand the latter as a
deviation from the former. Thus, to understand irrational behaviour one needs to specify
rational behaviour, which is taken as inherently understandable.11 Although rarely
explicated, we surmise that many economists hold a similar view. This is how we interpret
the common plea for microfounded models emphasizing ‘coherence’, ‘discipline’,
‘coherent stories’ or ‘precision’. Consider, for example, how Martin Eichenbaum
describes the issue ‘When I read Keynes, I have no idea what he means. What does it
mean to understand? …what the end of a complicated econometric procedure means in
terms  of  agents’  motivations.  What  do  they  think  they  are  responding  to?  Using
optimization models is just a way of being precise’ (Eichenbaum 2000).
Second, assuming irrational behaviour could be taken to be ad hoc because there
are always several different ways in which one can be irrational (Wickens 2010).
McCallum (2000, p, 118) puts the point as follows: rational expectations are used because
‘it is almost certainly unwise for policy to be conducted under the presumption that any
11 Although this is not the place to enter into this discussion, we believe this idea is
fundamentally flawed (see Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 2016).
particular pattern of expectational errors will prevail in the future’ [emphasis ours]. This
is particularly evident if the policy purports to take advantage of such errors. Rational
expectations are thus taken not to be ad hoc because they provide a single theory-based
solution to the problem of specifying expectations.
In contrast, non-rational microfoundations could be seen as offering an
embarrassment of riches, making rigorous model comparison difficult if not impossible.
One might argue that one needs fully rational agents to be able to see how deviations from
rationality affect the economy. If fully rational models are to function in a successful way
as such a baseline, they must allow comparison between different models: then one could
at least hope to isolate the different factors affecting the economy.
Consider, for example, some standard ways of creating inertia in the models, such
as assuming that part of the population is credit-constrained or exhibits habit persistence.
Whatever proportion of constrained people one assumes, the assumption is to some extent
ad hoc. It would perhaps not be ad hoc if it were possible to measure the actual proportion
of credit-constrained individuals or the degree of habit persistence. However, even if there
were available data on parameters that describe these issues, it would be difficult to
interpret them with a model that assumes fully rational individuals (Hansen and Heckman
1996). Thus, even though Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2009) claim that macromodels
should be consistent with microdata, in practice they cannot be fitted to all relevant
macro- and microdata simultaneously. This is why modellers typically test their models
only with respect to a set of carefully chosen micro-parameters (Wren-Lewis 2011).
Supplementing such considerations, Paul Romer (2015, forthcoming) notes that
DSGE modellers impose various unobservable restrictions on their estimations. This
critique meshes with Popper’s insistence that ad hoc hypotheses are not independently
testable (see Bamford 1993). Summers (1991) argued that over-identifying restrictions
makes it very hard to determine whether the theory failed due to its logical structure or to
particular auxiliary assumptions. Such problems are particularly acute because one kind
of ad hoc fix is typically not sufficient to make the RBC model consistent with data, and
because typically the models have to assume the existence of several different exogenous
unexplained shocks (cf. Wren-Lewis 2011). Finally, some argue that the dynamics in
DSGE models are largely driven by ad hoc fixes (De Grauwe 2011). The Smets-Wouters
model, for example, struggles to distinguish between the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, habit persistence and the autocorrelation coefficient of the preference shock
(Tovar 2009, p. 15).
These problems could be taken to imply that the fully rational model fails to
provide a useful benchmark after all: a benchmark must assist modellers in evaluating
what depends on what, but if this is impossible, as critics argue, the justification for using
‘microfounded’ models must come from somewhere else. If people are not, in fact, fully
rational, strong microfoundations requirements will never be fulfilled - not even in a
possible future when all the modelling problems concerning microfoundations will have
been solved. The possibility that economists ultimately cling to ‘microfoundations’
mostly for the Lakatosian reason is still very much alive.
Macroeconomic model selection reconsidered
In sum, there seem to be good reasons why modelling in macroeconomics is not practised
in the way Rodrik prescribes. The whole point of macroeconomics, be it theoretical or
policy oriented, is to take into account the general equilibrium effects across multiple
interdependent markets. However, as macroeconometricians have become painfully
aware, weeding these interdependencies out from macroeconomic time-series is next to
impossible without theoretically backed constraints. Macroeconomics is practised for
policy-advice purposes, and predicting the consequences of policy interventions is
impossible without knowledge of the underlying causal structure. A sensible approach to
finding such a theoretically backed structure would be to try to explicitly model the
behaviour of the agents making up the economy – by providing microfoundations. In
combination, the necessity of the common microfoundational core and the impossibility
of abstracting or idealizing away parts of the economy (because of general equilibrium
effects) mean that modelling proceeds in more of a vertical than a horizontal, manner.
Nevertheless, microfoundations have to come from somewhere and the
recalcitrant empirical shortcomings implied in the RE assumptions, which in turn need to
be corrected with apparently ad hoc modifications, cast some doubt on the
appropriateness of those that are chosen. Kevin Hoover (2006) argues that Michael
Woodford’s strategy in Interest and Prices (2003) was to explore the current theoretical
toolkit on the premise that these tools would be useful for policy in the future. As far as
Woodford was concerned, the representative-agent model was only the starting point for
a series of fuller and richer models that would eventually provide the basis for an adequate
macromodel. Therefore, the current generation of models deserves credence. Hoover
refers to this appeal to future vertical progress as ‘eschatological justification’ (see also
Hoover 2015), thereby challenging Woodford as follows:
If a central banker asks for advice today, would Woodford give it? And on
what basis? If  the practical  payoff of his research is only in its  utility for
some future analysis, then he should decline to give advice on the basis of
Interest and Prices and related research (Hoover 2006).
The impossibility of carrying out the microfoundational research programme may
be one reason why Solow (2010) refers to the demand for microfoundations as ‘generally
phony’. Wren-Lewis also notes that it is impossible to tell whether some standard
assumptions, such as ‘all firms are identical’, are critical to the model’s results. This is
often a judgment which cannot be shown to be correct because abandoning the
assumption would prove intractable (2011, p. 142).
Should macroeconomists, then, be more open to alternative modelling platforms
– to a more horizontal vision? We see the following possible ways of proceeding. First,
one could accept the demand for microfoundations and try to improve the models by
improving the microfoundations. The problem is, of course, that the menu of options is
severely limited. Although the idea that rational action is somehow explanatorily
privileged, and that deviations from rationality are somehow automatically ad hoc, is
fundamentally flawed, the worry that any alternative microfoundations would just
introduce another set of ad hocness into the models should still be taken seriously. Even
if assumptions concerning the behaviour of consumers and firms were more firmly rooted
in empirical research in areas such as behavioural economics, they should still be
implemented in a model, thus requiring at least some ‘ad hoc’ idealizations and
abstractions in turn. As things stand, the prospects for truly behavioural macroeconomics
are uncertain.
Second, one could take the stance that the DSGE framework somehow manages
to capture structural macro-level dependencies regardless of the apparent falsity of the
microfoundations. Something like this could be argued for on the basis of Don Ross’s
ontology of economics (Ross 2014, chapter 5). DSGE models would be patterns of cross-
market dependencies, and any form of mechanistic justification for these structures in
terms of individual behaviour would just be a red herring. Such a stance would entail
extreme pragmatism related to the myriad ad hoc assumptions involved in DSGE
modelling: any modification improving the empirical performance of the model (Calvo-
pricing being a prime example) should be acceptable regardless of whether or not it can
be rationalized in terms of microfoundations.
Third, one could forgo the hope that any structure could be derived from
economic theory and concentrate more humbly on empirical methods of causal
inference. This is the stance taken by Kevin Hoover (2015), for example, and would
also mean abandoning the whole DSGE programme as ill-founded theoretical hubris.
The crisis of 2009 has generated not just methodological critique but also new
approaches that take some of it into account (Reis 2018). Another noteworthy
development is the emergence of an explicit model-comparison framework, the idea
being to create a library of macromodels that are easily accessible and that could thus be
compared with little effort (see e.g., Wieland 2012). We assume that such model
comparisons would be a welcome addition to Rodrik’s model-selection account because
they would seem to allow empirical comparison that is not restricted to ‘microfounded’
models. As a matter of fact, central banks have always used several models
simultaneously as tools for better judgment-making: only microfoundations
fundamentalists believe in removing the role of judgment entirely (see e.g., du Plessis
2010, Colander 2011). Finally, although it has long been acknowledged to some extent,
there is now more widespread acceptance among macroeconomists that several different
kinds of models are needed. Central banks will continue to use whatever they find useful
for their purposes, including DSGE models.
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